Introduction {#S1}
============

Simulation is an important method for improving patient safety and quality of care ([@B1]) at individual, team, and system level ([@B2]). Team-based simulation can improve patient safety ([@B3]--[@B8]) by targeting team deficiencies, the greatest driver of lapses in patient safety ([@B9]). However, teamwork training alone will not overcome flaws in the fabric of the workplace. High reliability organizations (e.g., civil aviation) use *in situ* simulation to expose system vulnerability and hidden system flaws. These hidden threats are termed latent threats (LTs) ([@B10]). Proactive LT detection by *in situ* simulation is reported in emergency medicine, anesthesia, and pediatrics ([@B11]--[@B13]). *In situ* simulation is ideal for identifying LTs in the real work environment, using actual hospital systems, particularly during infrequent high stakes circumstances ([@B14]). Vulnerabilities in delivery settings deemed "safe" have been unveiled ([@B11]) and flaws in facility operational effectiveness detected ([@B13], [@B15]). *In situ* simulation offers a systematic and realistic picture of work because system flaws are contextualized in real time and place ([@B3]).

Patient safety incidents (PSIs) are unintended events with potential for patient harm, and all members of staff are encouraged to report these to Datix^®^. PSI reporting is a statutory function of National Health Service (NHS) Improvement to reduce patient risks through the National Patient Safety Alerting System ([@B16]). Critiques of PSI reporting highlight a misplaced scrutiny on counting reports, rather than organizational learning from events ([@B17], [@B18]) and the difficulties of feeding-back to frontline staff ([@B19]--[@B21]).

There is a paucity of research on the effect of LT detection on traditional safety models such as Datix^®^.

We hypothesized that LTs identified during *in situ* simulation courses could occur in real life; therefore, mitigating LTs through service improvements might improve patient safety. We aimed to measure: The quantity, category, and subsequent service improvements of LTs.The quantity, category, and subsequent action plans for PSIs (reported on Datix^®^) occurring during the same period and including 1 year before the program inception in 2008.The similarities between PSI Datix^®^ and LTs before and after service improvements.

Materials and Methods {#S2}
=====================

The Simulated interPRofessional Team Training (SPRinT) program at Royal Brompton Hospital is an embedded *in situ* inter-professional simulation team training program that runs courses in all areas of pediatric care ([@B22]). SPRinT faculty are frontline multidisciplinary staff including nurses, nurse educators, anesthetic and intensive care consultants, and medical and surgical trainees. There is a minimum of one nurse and one doctor faculty member at each SPRinT course. Participants are all staff involved with pediatric care including all grades of medical, surgical, and anesthetic staff (consultant and junior doctors), nursing staff (charge nurse and band five to seven nurses), and allied health professionals (health-care assistants, family liaison officers, and physiotherapists). The validated *in situ* 2-h SPRinT session ([@B23]) includes crisis resource management training, a simulated scenario followed by 45 min video-assisted debriefing \[utilizing advocacy--inquiry methodology ([@B24])\]. Scenarios are derived from real events including serious untoward incidents. Identification, investigation, and mitigation of LTs uncovered during courses are an integral part of SPRinT's commitment to improving patient safety.

LTs and Service Improvements {#S2-1}
----------------------------

During the debriefing after a simulation scenario, all faculty and participants identify any LTs that have occurred and suggest and discuss proposals for service improvement. These events are recorded at the time by two faculty members on a specific LT *pro forma*. LT severity is graded according to national Datix^®^ coding system. Datix^®^ is the online reporting system used by NHS organizations to report PSIs. They color code incidents from potential to cause harm (green), to causing minimal harm (yellow), to causing significant temporary harm (amber), and to permanent harm or death (red). LTs were uploaded to a SPRinT risk database from 2008 until February 2012 after which a specific LT reporting section on Datix^®^ was developed, the reporting criteria remained the same.

Latent threats recorded from Paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) SPRinT courses from April 2008 to April 15 were retrospectively reviewed. SPRinT clinical fellows PK and HM independently categorized LTs according to seven descriptive categories: education and training, resources, equipment, work and environment, medication, organization and strategic, and protocols and systems. All differences were resolved by agreement.

Service improvements for LTs discussed during the SPRinT debriefing session are implemented by the SPRinT and department lead. All service improvements were quantified and grouped independently (HM and PK) according to nine categories: no change; looking into; ongoing quality improvement project (QIP); staff communication; guidelines; education; equipment/resources; organizational change; and all events reviewed by root cause analysis, serious case review, or serious hazard of transfusion.

PSIs and Action Plans {#S2-2}
---------------------

All PSIs on PICU reported to Datix^®^ from April 2007 to April 2015 were reviewed and independently categorized by Philip Knight and Helen MacGloin according to the same seven descriptive categories used for LTs. All differences were resolved by agreement.

Hospital risk management, quality, and safety departments organize regular review of Datix^®^ and subsequent action plans are made. These action plans are instituted by the lead for incident reporting for that department. Action plans for PSIs were quantified and grouped independently (Helen MacGloin and Philip Knight) according to the same nine categories used for service improvements.

Statistical Comparison {#S2-3}
----------------------

The quantity, category, and grading of LTs and PSIs were compared to assess any impact of LT service improvements on PSIs over time. This review was registered as a quality improvement initiative exempt from ethics review.

Results {#S3}
=======

Category Analysis of PSIs and Their Action Plans {#S3-1}
------------------------------------------------

1,946 PSIs were identified with severity grading of 1,405 (72%) with the potential to cause harm (green), 480 (25%) causing minimal harm (yellow), 60 (3%) causing significant temporary harm (amber), and 1 (0.05%) causing permanent harm or death (red). 1,140 (59%) PSIs could not be categorized because the precipitating cause could not be accurately identified, e.g., unanticipated surgery, initiation of extracorporeal membrane oxygenation.

Of 806 (41%) PSIs that could be categorized, medication PSIs accounted for 512 (64%), most reported errors in drug recording or controlled drug spillages. Other medication PSIs included prescribing errors, delayed or incorrect administration, or issues with expired and out of stock medications. 133 (17%) resource PSIs included missing resuscitation ventilator equipment, or infusion sets. 103 (13%) equipment PSIs included equipment failure requiring servicing or replacement. 29 (4%) work and environment PSIs included issues with arrest buzzers, blocked sinks, and bed-spaces. 13 (2%) PSI systems and protocols reports included provision of specialist services out of hours. Nine (1%) education and training PSIs included lack of knowledge of guidelines. Organization and strategic PSIs accounted for seven (0.9%) including incidents due to emergency admission pathways.

984 (51%) of all PSIs had 1,008 action plans; 962 (49%) reported only the event (without action plan). 622 (62%) involved staff communication (including individual staff spoken to, reminders, emails, signs safety and medicine bulletins, and patient safety newsletters). 132 (13%) planned to look into the event further; 104 (10%) planned new resources or fixed equipment; 40 (4%) planned organizational changes; 32 (3%) planned educational workshops, induction, changes to training or focused teaching; 32 (3%) planned to address the event within an existing QIP 24 (2%) new/updated guidelines; 22 (2%) were root cause analyses, serious untoward incidents, and serious hazards of transfusion.

Category Analysis of LTs and Service Improvements {#S3-2}
-------------------------------------------------

201 SPRinT courses involved 1,144 inter-professional staff (488 doctors, 543 nurses, and 113 other allied professionals). 44 LTs were identified (1 LT per 4.6 courses) (Figure [1](#F1){ref-type="fig"}).

![Latent threats over time.](fped-05-00281-g001){#F1}

44 LTs were uncovered and category analysis showed 16 (36%) related to resources, 12 (27%) education and training, 5 (11%) equipment, 3 (7%) organizational and strategic; 3 (7%) work and environment, 3 (7%) medication; 2 (5%) systems and protocols (Figure [2](#F2){ref-type="fig"}). LTs severity ranking of risk was 18 (40.9%) LTs with the potential to cause harm, 20 (45.5%) LTs that would cause minimal harm, 6 (13.6%) LTs that would cause significant temporary harm. LTs reached a peak in 2012 and then reduced over time year on year (Figure [1](#F1){ref-type="fig"}).

![Latent threat category of risk.](fped-05-00281-g002){#F2}

43 subsequent service improvements were developed (2 LTs addressed by one service improvement); 4 (9.3%) of which were implemented trust wide (Tables [1](#T1){ref-type="table"} and [2](#T2){ref-type="table"}).

###### 

LTs with the potential to cause harm.

  LT with the potential to cause harm (*n* = 18)                      LT category              System improvement                                                  System improvement category
  ------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------
  Emergency drug doses unknown without emergency drug chart           Resources                Patient-specific emergency drug chart printed before admission      Resources/equipment
  No patient specific emergency drug chart available                  Resources                Basic emergency drug doses chart added to arrest trolleys           Resources/equipment
  Bleep numbers for on-call staff not known/easily accessible         Resources                Numbers for on-call teams displayed in all bays and PICU board      Resources/equipment
  No lightweight in-line ETCO~2~ lines available---out of stock       Resources                Stock ordering change ensuring in-line CO~2~ lines available        Resources/equipment
  Formula for sizing of ETT not known                                 Resources                ETT formula added to emergency drug chart for pre-calculation       Resources/equipment
  Inability to identify pediatric from adult chest opening trolley    Equipment                Trolleys clearly labeled *(trust wide)*                             Resources/equipment
  ECG machine not available                                           Equipment                Bid for new ECG machine                                             Resources/equipment
  ECG paper ran out during SVT scenario                               Resources                Replenished and staff made aware of importance                      Resources/equipment
  Delay in finding magnets on arrest trolleys to reset ICD            Resources                Magnets added to arrest trolley contents                            Resources/equipment
  Staff unsure how to use magnets for resetting ICDs                  Education and training   Workshops introduced                                                Education
  New nursing staff did not know how to use emergency buzzers         Education and training   Wall buzzers labeled, nurse induction updated                       Education
  Radiographers not pediatric BLS trained                             Education and training   BLS training for radiographers mandatory                            Education
  Nursing staff not EPLS/PILS trained                                 Education and training   Funding for additional places for EPLS and PILS training secured    Education
  Nurse bleeped rather than dialing 2222 for crash call               Education and training   Email sent to all staff; 2222 instruction stickers on ward phones   Staff communication
  Clock for timings during CPR difficult to see                       Work and environment     Clocks moved to be more visible and provided in each side room      Resources/equipment
  Buzzer did not sound when used in simulation                        Work and environment     Buzzer system testing regularly                                     Organizational
  CBL[^a^](#tfn1){ref-type="table-fn"} protocol difficult to follow   Systems and protocols    New CBL protocol and attached to arrest trolley (trust wide)        Guideline
  Hyperkalemia guideline difficult to follow during emergency         Systems and protocols    Guideline adapted into easy to follow algorithm                     Guideline

*LT, latent threat; PICU, Paediatric Intensive Care Unit; BLS, basic life support; EPLS, European Pediatric Life Support; ICDs, implantable cardioverter defibrillators; CPR, cardiopulmonary resuscitation; PSI, patient safety incident; CBL, catastrophic blood loss*.

*^a^LTs related to 2 CBL simulations annotated (*n* = 5)*.

*LTs never detected as PSI ![](fped-05-00281-i001.jpg)*.

*LTs reported as PSI ![](fped-05-00281-i002.jpg)*.

###### 

LTs that would cause minimal harm and significant temporary harm.

  LT that would cause minimal harm (*n* = 20)                                                                                                                                  LT category              System improvement                                              System improvement category
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------
  Difficulty contacting PICU consultants *via* switchboard                                                                                                                     Resources                Nurse in charge given PICU mobile with phone numbers            Resources/equipment
  Intubation drugs in multiple areas---delaying intubation                                                                                                                     Resources                Emergency intubation boxes introduced and stored in fridge      Resources/equipment
  Intubation drugs in locked cupboard---delay in finding keys                                                                                                                  Resources                                                                                
  Doses for emergency intubation drugs not known                                                                                                                               Resources                Dosage card developed for intubation box                        Resources/equipment
  Arrest algorithms not readily available during cardiac arrest                                                                                                                Resources                Arrest algorithms laminated and attached to arrest trolleys     Resources/equipment
  Team unable to contact consultant cardiothoracic surgeon                                                                                                                     Resources                Cardiothoracic phone numbers added to PICU phone                Resources/equipment
  Lack of time awareness---delay in administering adenosine                                                                                                                    Resources                Digital timers obtained for each arrest trolley                 Resources/equipment
  Naloxone dose and administration not known                                                                                                                                   Education and training   Naloxone added to patient-specific emergency drug chart         Resources/equipment
  Staff[^a^](#tfn2){ref-type="table-fn"} unaware of CBL protocol                                                                                                               Education and training   CBL protocol workshops and emphasized at induction              Education
  Staff unsure how to get additional help for deteriorating patient                                                                                                            Education and training   Email sent to all staff and reinforced at induction             Education
  Staff reluctant to use pre-drawn up adrenaline                                                                                                                               Education and training   Simulation nurse led educational drive on benefits/use          Education
  Staff unfamiliar with item location in chest re-opening trolley                                                                                                              Education and training   Labels added to chest re-opening drawers                        Resources/equipment
  Wrong chest opening set on chest opening trolley                                                                                                                             Equipment                Stocking of chest opening trolley reviewed                      Organizational
  Delay finding correct sized FM and T-piece post operatively                                                                                                                  Equipment                All patients transferred with mask and T-piece from theater     Organizational
  Suction unit for emergency chest re-opening trolley not working                                                                                                              Equipment                BME rectified defect with unit                                  Equipment
  Adenosine not part of standard resuscitation drug tray                                                                                                                       Medication               Adenosine added to resuscitation drug tray                      Resources
  Metaraminol unavailable during hypercyanotic scenario                                                                                                                        Medication               Metaraminol added to resuscitation emergency drug tray          Resources
  Difficulty[^a^](#tfn2){ref-type="table-fn"} contacting transfusion during a CBL scenario                                                                                     Organizational           Emergency bleep for blood transfusion technician                Organizational
  Cardiologist did not arrive with arrest team                                                                                                                                 Organizational           Pediatric cardiology registrar added to arrest team             Organizational
  Over 3 min to find drug cupboard keys                                                                                                                                        Resources                Funding initiated for keyless drug cupboards                    Resources/Equipment
  **LT that would cause significant temporary harm (*n* = 6)**                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  No insulin available for hyperkalemia leading to VF arrest                                                                                                                   Medication               Ensured that insulin pharmacy requests in place                 Resources/equipment
  Echo unavailable when required urgently to confirm cardiac tamponade. Chest re-opened without echo confirmation due decompensating condition and subsequent cardiac arrest   Resources                Capital bid for new echo                                        Resources/equipment
  Staff members did not know how to use defibrillator                                                                                                                          Education and training   Defibrillator workshops introduced                              Education
  Emergency[^a^](#tfn2){ref-type="table-fn"} drug chart used to verify patient during CBL                                                                                      Education and training   CBL protocol reinforced and increased emphasis at induction     Education
  Staff[^a^](#tfn2){ref-type="table-fn"} unable to reach patient whilst phoning transfusion                                                                                    Work and environment     Cordless phones obtained for emergency use                      Resources/equipment
  Wrong[^a^](#tfn2){ref-type="table-fn"} blood collected during CBL scenario                                                                                                   Organizational           Blood collection policy change---handed over person to person   Organizational

*LT, latent threat; PICU, Paediatric Intensive Care Unit; PSI, patient safety incident; CBL, catastrophic blood loss*.

*^a^LTs related to 2 CBL simulations annotated (*n* = 5)*.

*LTs never detected as PSI ![](fped-05-00281-i001.jpg)*.

*LTs reported as PSI ![](fped-05-00281-i002.jpg)*.

There were three scenarios that were particularly high yield, uncovering multiple high-risk LTs. The first was a catastrophic blood loss (CBL) dual location SPRinT course in PICU and the Blood Transfusion Laboratory (BTL) involving three teams (anesthesia, PICU, and cardiothoracic surgery). Real-time simultaneous video-recording enabled a unique perspective on LTs at the PICU and the BTL interface. A 15-point PICU checklist was developed for this dual site simulation and its adherence was assessed (adherence 30%) and a 14-point checklist in BTL (adherence 100%). LT's was uncovered including a delay contacting BTL technician, difficulty implementing emergency CBL management and collection of the wrong blood unit (Table [2](#T2){ref-type="table"}). Following these events, emergency blood tracking requirements were changed so that issued blood units could be handed directly from BTL staff to PICU staff, rather than collection of blood units from the blood refrigerator.

Retesting of the CBL protocol during a second SPRinT course highlighted unfamiliarity with the new CBL protocol and failure to order all blood products (FPP, platelets, and cryoprecipitate). Subsequent service improvements included changes to mandatory staff training requirements, repeated simulation and refinement of CBL protocol with departmental education and subsequently implementation trust wide.

The second scenario involved an emergency resternotomy post cardiac surgery and uncovered five LTs that would have caused harm. They included the inability to perform a cardiac echocardiogram on a deteriorating simulated patient with cardiac tamponade, because the echo machine was in use elsewhere. Difficulty distinguishing adult and pediatric chest re-opening sets, difficulty in locating items on chest opening trolley, difficulty in contacting cardiothoracic surgeons, and delay in administering treatment due to time searching for drug cupboard keys (Table [2](#T2){ref-type="table"}). Service improvements included a successful capital bid for an extra echo machine, purchase of mobile phone for nurse in charge and uploading consultants' phone numbers, organizing automated drug cabinet and open chest trolley.

The third scenario was of hyperkalaemia progressing to ventricular fibrillation and cardiac arrest. LTs uncovered: lack of insulin (an essential part of emergency treatment), lack of awareness of the hyperkalaemia protocol, and lack of knowledge on correct use of the defibrillator. To mitigate the latter, *in situ* simulated electrophysiology workshops and defibrillation simulation scenarios reviewing external pacing and using internal defibrillation paddles were developed and 70 staff members participated (May 2011--February 2012).

Impact of LT Service Improvements on Future PSIs {#S3-3}
------------------------------------------------

Latent threats matched 24 (1%) of 1,946 PSIs. The impact of service improvements for these LTs was investigated.

The LT of poor management of hyperkalaemia was preceded by four hyperkalaemia PSIs of different causes. After service improvement (Table [1](#T1){ref-type="table"}), one PSI occurred which was a record of the hyperkalaemia event with appropriate treatment and no adverse event.

The emergency buzzer failure LT was preceded by three similar PSIs with planned follow-up by the operational manager. After service improvement of implementation of regular system testing (Table [1](#T1){ref-type="table"}), there were no further PSIs.

The two LTs of difficulty calling essential staff to the simulated emergency were preceded by two similar PSIs. In 2009, simulation participants were unable to contact on-call PICU consultants *via* switchboard, following which a mobile phone programmed with all the PICU consultant contact details was obtained for the PICU charge nurse. However, difficulties contacting other essential staff resulted in the same LT recurring, therefore the mobile phone contact list was updated. No further LTs or PSIs from difficulties in calling essential staff recurred.

Three CBL PSIs preceded the first simulated CBL scenario (Figure [3](#F3){ref-type="fig"}) although before this, CBL was not audited; therefore, these data are not robust. One of these CBL PSIs highlighted poor team communication, recommending SPRinT simulations to improve team communication and emergency chest opening training, which was subsequently carried out.

![Paediatric Intensive Care Unit CBL Catastrophic Blood Loss Events (April 2007--2015) and impact of Simulation Led Service Improvements.](fped-05-00281-g003){#F3}

Two CBL PSIs occurred between the first and second CBL simulations in 2012. The first CBL PSI reported incorrect patient identification resulting in transfusion with blood intended for another child. The second PSI reported incorrect activation of CBL protocol. LT system improvements were implemented subsequent to the second CBL simulation, and in 2013 four CBL events occurred without PSIs. CBL PSIs in 2014 and 2015 reported difficulties contacting the blood transfusion technician because a CBL arrest call had not been properly activated.

Resource LTs (ETCO~2~ lines and ECG paper) repeated as real events despite service improvements. Despite improved stock ordering after detecting lack of ETCO~2~ lines, this was followed by three similar PSIs. The LT from lack of ECG paper was preceded by one similar PSI and despite service improvement, recurred as two PSIs.

34 LTs (77%) were never recorded as PSIs therefore the impact of the relevant service improvement could not be assessed. This encompassed all systems and protocols LTs (2/2); all equipment LTs (5/5); 10/12 (83%) education LTs; 13/16 (81%) resource LTs; 2/3 (66.7%) work and environment LTs; 1/3 (33%) medication, and 1/3 (33%) organizational LTs.

Discussion {#S4}
==========

*In situ* SPRinT courses identified LTs and implemented simple system adaptations rapidly with minimal cost or manpower. This echoes other *in situ* simulation studies reporting immediate risk mitigation and simple changes with few resources ([@B12]). *In situ* simulation coupled to system improvements is embraced by staff who witnessed the potential risk of LT to a real patient during simulation. Program engagement likely resulted from empowering staff to test hospital protocols, equipment, and environment for real system flaws. Such adaptive safety initiatives align with Berwick's plea for frontline staff to be enabled to identify problems, test changes, and lead service improvements ([@B25]).

The majority of LTs were due to lack of resources and education and training deficits. Of the 12 LTs which recurred despite service improvements, half were due to lack of resources. Other LT studies similarly unveiled poorly understood policies, staff training deficiencies, and issues with critical materials and supplies ([@B26], [@B27]). In our review, seemingly improbable events during simulation (lack of insulin to treat hyperkalaemia and incorrect patient identification for blood transfusion) resurfaced in real life as PSIs. In addition, LTs uncovered significant training needs (e.g., defibrillation skills) unreported as PSI because education deficits are not well highlighted by incident reports.

Only 1% of PSIs were similar to LTs which might reflect the limitations of incident reporting and make PSIs poor measures of safety and quality improvement ([@B28], [@B29]). We also felt that because few of the LTs had corresponding PSIs this actually showed the unique value of simulation over patient safety reporting and are treating this as a positive finding. In addition, incident reporting and *in situ* simulation provide different vistas on safety. Other studies have highlighted the need for different approaches to build a comprehensive picture of safety because of the complementary yet different information provided by each approach ([@B30]).

Some repeat simulation scenarios enabled development and testing of protocols and a shared perspective ordinarily unavailable. For example, the dual location CBL simulations enabled a unique observation of simulated error at the interface of care between PICU and blood transfusion. This perspective resulted in an interdepartmental collaborative approach to patient safety, facilitated learning, and supported the rationale for system improvement. Although statistically impossible to prove CBL events are safer (due to rarity), CBL PSI grading lessened after system improvements. Likewise trust wide introduction of an intubation box reduced the time to intubate in all areas. Subsequently, excessive time to prepare for intubation has not recurred as an LT in simulated events. However, as never reported as a PSI, system improvement impact cannot be assessed, although it is obvious that reduction in time to intubate improves patient care in a high-risk environment.

Comparing medication LTs and PSIs is interesting. Although most PSIs reported medication errors, emergency drug dose calculations never featured as a PSI possibly because of one of the LT service improvements (emergency drug charts).

The traditional definition of safety (safety 1) is the absence of harm ([@B31]). However, safety is not just non-events but a proactive sensitivity to the possibility of failure ([@B32]). This deeper understanding of work-as-done enables anticipation of events and team and system flexibility and resilience ([@B33]). *In situ* simulation can encompass both safety perspectives. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to review LT detection over time, providing a rich reflection of work-as-done. Measuring LTs from simulation could be developed similarly by other trusts as a proxy safety metric, in conjunction with traditional retrospective PSI reporting, as complementary approaches to safety.

There were several limitations to this study. PSIs on Datix^®^ were reviewed to assess the impact of service improvements on safety. However, voluntary reporting of adverse incidents captures only a minority of incidents and is subject to significant bias ([@B30]). The possibility of bias and missing CBL events was recognized prompting review of the blood transfusion audit. PSI limitations could have been overcome by triangulating them with other records of patient safety events such as patient complaint records, risk management databases, and safety walk-rounds. Retrospective categorization was another source of potential bias. There is no standard nomenclature for error analysis on PICUs although frameworks for incident analysis could have been adapted ([@B34]). Other simulation studies have used failure modes effects analysis (FMEA) coupled to simulation training to prioritize predicted risk to enable solution development in stratified order ([@B35]). In contrast, we addressed LTs as detected, according to the perceived patient risk because some FMEA critiques highlight the lack of evidence base and the resource heavy methodology involved ([@B36]).

Iterative testing of system improvement efficacy was not performed which might have prevented later emergence of LTs as PSIs 2--3 years later. Follow-up interviews checking solution success might have enabled system improvement efficacy to be assessed ([@B26]). Another limitation was that the review was limited to PSIs and LTs from PICU, excluding LTs detected elsewhere in the directorate (e.g., PACU and the cardiac ward). Finally, participant psychological safety could have been threatened by reporting education and training LTs. Reassuringly, anonymous participant feedback never reported a negative impact on learning.

Conclusion {#S5}
==========

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study comparing LTs identified during *in situ* simulation to existing safety reporting systems and evaluate subsequent service improvements. The unique strengths of *in situ* simulation were highlighted. First, the identification of potential threats to patient safety particularly for training and knowledge gaps undetected elsewhere. Second, *in situ* simulation offered a real-time unbiased multi-professional approach to patient safety.

Modern health-care pressures require better models of safety ([@B34]) and perspectives reflecting health care's socio-technical system complexity. This cannot be achieved by one safety model but the best way to measure their individual or combined impact is unclear.

More work is required to integrate the strengths of *in situ* simulation into traditional models of patient care and safety and robustly measure its efficacy. This would enable *in situ* simulation to be harnessed by existing health-care systems and accepted as a valuable safety improvement modality.
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